INTRODUCTION
T\vo themes take pride of place in the literature on German-Latin American relations in the 19th and 20th centuries: firstly, the Auswanderung and the German colonies in different parts of Latin America, and secondly, German imperialist ambitions in the American hemisphere from the 1880s onwards To a large extent the history of German trade relations with Latin America still has to be written. Part of it is recorded in the avid descriptions made by a former generation of historians, in which the heroic deeds of German businessmen were described and often acclaimed with unconcealed admiration 2 ; other bits and pieces have been investigated by regional historians and postgraduate research students 3 . Nevertheless, much of the history of German commerce in Latin America is still obscure. This is a lamentable situation. It could be argued that only detailed knowledge of international trading pat- terns and specific research on the position of expatriate businessmen in Latin America will enable us to understand the economic dynamics of regional development in Latin America.
European trade relations with Latin America have been analysed from a predominantly macro-economic perspective. The focus has been on the flow of commodities, the organisation of the European markets and the rivalry between the industrialised countries. This research led to fierce discussions about the effects of international commodity trade on the development of the young Latin American republics.
The representatives of the dependencia school asserted that this international trade had only reinforced, if not brought about, Latin American underdevelopment 4 . It did not take long for scholars from different academic and ideological backgrounds to start to raise questions and to attack the self-evident and mechanistic explanations which often characterized dependencia writings. The British historian, D.C.M. Piatt, has been the most provocative critic of the dependentistas 5 . He has argued that British entrepreneurs were able to extract only small profits from their Latin American investments. While stressing the power of local governments, he emphasized the reluctance of the Home Office to lend active support to the claims of British merchants. On the other hand, Marxist oriented scholars have pointed to the class relations within Latin America. They have questioned the emphasis on international exploitation and inequality and showed how class alliances between the Latin American bourgeoisie and the European entrepreneurs were essential in shaping Latin American capitalism 6 .
Most of the participants would now agree that more detailed and monographic research is needed in order to solve the many problems held an insignificant position within the German merchant community often possessed substantial economic and even political power in a regional Latin American context. This was especially the case in the smaller Central American and West Indian republics, where the state was weak and unable to control social and economic processes. It is the purpose of this article to sketch in a very provisional way an example of such a "regional" analyses of international trade. German-Dominican relations may well provide us with notions that can serve in developing a more balanced analysis of international trade relations.
The tobacco export firmly linked the northern part of the Dominican Republic to the two Hanseatic cities, Hamburg and Bremen. These two cities were the centre of the international tobacco trade for more than a century. Dominican tobacco formed only an infinitesimal part of the total Hanseatic trade, but for the northern valley of the Dominican Republic where the tobacco was produced, the German market was essential. During the 19th century more than 90% of its tobacco went to Hamburg and Bremen. German merchants virtually controlled the influx of money in the area and they possessed substantial economic power. This position underwent changes when competition on the international market increased and Dominican tobacco entered a crisis at the end of the 19th century. At the same time the Hanseatic trade was subject to the structural changes in the position of the Hanseatic cities and their incorporation in the German Reich. These changes took place in the context of growing German-US rivalry in the Caribbean basin from the 1880s onwards. The First World War completed the process in which the USA definitively acquired the hegemony in the region. German presence decreased to nil during the war. German merchants gradually reappeared after 1920, receiving another severe blow in the 1930s when the world crisis interrupted international trade.
In this article it will not be possible to pay much attention to the political side of internationl trade. German international politics interfered with events in the Carribean on various occasions and Santo Domingo also had its share of German gunboat diplomacy n . Until more 11 See: J.F. Rippy, "The Initiation of the Custom Receivership in the Dominican Republic": Hispanic American Historical Review 17 (1937), pp. 419-457. Also the correspondence of F.M. Wolff, who repeatedly asked for German military intervention in the Dominican Republic. When finally the S.M.S. Straßburg had arrived in Puerto Plata in 1914 -"zum Schutze der deutschen Interessen" -Wolff wrote: "The intervention of the German cruiser 'Straßburg' has made more impression on the government research has been done we can only say that German imperialism was quite unsuccessful. The fierce imperialist rhetoric which characterized German foreign policy around 1900 could not hide the fact that Germany was unable to challenge US hegemony in the Caribbean. Besides, the German merchants were not really interested in international politics and usually refrained from meddling in local politics.
TKE GERMAN-DOMINICAN TOBACCO TKADE BEFORE 1880
Commercial cultivation of the tobacco plant in the Dominican Republic began at the end of the 18th century as a result of the commercial dynamism under the Bourbons in the last phase of Spanish colonialism. During the turbulent years following the slave revolt in neighbouring Saint-Domingue, an independent peasantry came into existence in the northern part of the country, usually called the Cibao. Thousands of smallholding peasants continued to cultivate the crop as a way to earn a small cash income besides their subsistence agriculture. German brigs had already dropped anchor on the northern coasts and shipped tobacco to the Hanseatic towns in North Germany during the Haitian occupation of the Spanish-speaking eastern part of the country (1822-1844) 12 . This trade stabilized after Dominican independence. Dominican intermediaries organized the purchase of the harvest and German merchants established themselves in Puerto Plata, the northern port of the new republic.
The rapid replacement of the Spanish monopoly by the Hanseatic merchants was a good example of the remarkably effective Hanseatic reaction to Latin American independence. German and British merchants had already taken advantage of the liberalization of Spanish trade in the late 18th century 13 . After the occupation of Germany by the Napoleonic armies, the Hanseatic cities did not waste time in establishing commercial here than any complaints and objections of the parties directly involved . . ' 14 . This Latin American connection was so important that Mathies could write: "The Hanseatic cities owed their resurgence to the dissociation of the Spanish colonies in Central-and South America from their motherlands"
15 .
The centre of German mercantile activities in the Caribbean basin was the Danish freeport in the Virgin islands, St. Thomas. Most mercantile houses had a representative there, who organized monetary transactions and supervised the shipment of goods from the ocean-going ships to smaller coastal vessels. Even the merchants who resided in other parts of the Caribbean maintained close contact with this centre of trade, information and credit 16 . In close co-operation with British trade, the two Hanseatic freeports became important staple markets again. They developed more as Atlantic, almost British markets than as part of continental Germany. Historical research has tended to emphasize GermanBritish competition in the 19th century 17 , without giving due attention to the specific position of the Hanseatic cities. In fact, Hamburg and Bremen were closely linked to the British economy by way of credits, joint ventures and shipping arrangements. Kindleberger observes with respect to the position of Hamburg: "[It] built a tradition of being an English rather than a German city"
18 . The merchants of these cities did not share the nationalist sentiments which were rapidly gaining importance in the rest of Germany. They wanted their interests protected but -although exceptions occurred -did not want to get involved in Germany's imperialist ambitions.
The production of tobacco in the Cibao increased rapidly in response to German demand and favourable prices. Production rose from an average of 25.000 quintales (a quintal is 46 kg.) in the 1840s, to some 50.000 quintales in the 1850s and 80.000 in the 1870s. Tobacco yielded good prices in this period and it became the principal cash crop of the region. Alongside the peasant producers, larger landholders were enthusiastic tobacco cultivators. Because of the scarcity of labour, large-scale tobacco cultivation did not develop, but the crop was considered quite profitable by the affluent inhabitants of the Cibao. Gradually commerce became better organized. The tobacco was bought -often by way of small, sporadic advances to the peasant families -by local shopkeepers or seasonal traders, usually called corredores. These intermediaries delivered the tobacco to the urban merchants in Santiago de los Caballeros and other provincial towns. The tobacco was then transported by groups of pack-animals (recuas) to Puerto Plata, from where it was shipped to Germany by native and German exporters. The trade depended basically on the balance between the export of tobacco and the import of European goods. Credit was its lifeline. The advances of the German merchants enabled the Dominican merchants to buy the tobacco which they could later exchange for imported consumer goods. In the last instance, the yield of the tobacco harvest determined the fate of the Dominican merchants and, for that matter, of the Cibao as a region. The money that poured into the country every spring when the harvest began propelled the region's economy and animated social life. In 1867 it was reported that more than a million pesos were circulating in the Cibao as a consequence of the tobacco harvest 19 . Another observer described it in more romantic terms: "It may be said that the time of the tobacco harvest is here the blessed golden age in which, according to the legend, everything is content and happiness" 20 .
The nexus of German-Dominican trade relations lay in Puerto Plata (and to some extent in the other northern port, Monte Cristi). German merchants settled there from the 1840s onwards to coordinate the export.
Many of them were relatively small and financially dependent on the Bremen or Hamburg importers. Sometimes they were only able to stay in business a few years. Some even went bankrupt and had to leave the country. In this way they symbolized the erratic and unstable nature of international trade in this first period of mercantile expansion 21 . Other merchants stayed longer and forged lasting links with the region. J.W. Kuck, who arrived in the Cibao in 1848, was such a person. He made friends with leading members of the Cibao elite and stayed some twenty years in the country 22 . When he returned to Hamburg he became Dominican consul. Fifty years later we find his son (?), Robert Kuck, as the chargé d'affaires of the Dominican Republic in Germany. Another Hamburg merchant, Gustaf Zeller, arrived around 1850 and rapidly became an important tobacco exporter. When the tobacco trade entered its crisis and German demand slackened, he became one of the first cocoa planters and probably stayed in the country until his death. The sources give very little evidence that the German importers used their financial superiority to exercise political pressure in the region. Nevertheless when the mercantile class of the Cibao rose in open rebellion against the financial policy of Buenaventura Báez in 1857, the Germans supported them openly. This was not surprising since the financial measures of the government were an attempt to divert the profits of the tobacco trade to the state sector which was controlled by the large landowners of the South. As such they were a direct attack on the tobacco interests of the Cibao. Money was sent from St. Thomas and Germany to support the rebels cause 23 .
The principal weakness of the Cibao economy was its double dependence: on Germany as a market and on tobacco as an export product. In the following section we try to show the consequences of each of these two elements.
As long as the market remained favourable, trade in the Cibao prospered and fortunes were made. However, when prices decreased or German demand disappeared, the Cibao economy was on the verge of collapse. We will see later what it meant for this to be the "normal" situation. The French-Prussian war of 1870 provided the merchants with a calamitous warning:
"A great gloom existed and still exists in the minds of the inhabitants of this province because of the shortage of circulating money, a situation which makes all the social classes suffer, especially since the European War has impeded the shipping of our tobacco, the principal or only element that always provides us with silver and gold" 24 .
It is not surprising that already in this early period of tobacco trade when circumstances were relatively favourable, Dominican merchants were feeling uneasy about the dominant position of German commerce 25 . The increased tobacco production within the Cibao had brought into existence a numerous and pluriform mercantile class. Contradictions also existed in the region itself. Most of the mercantile houses in Santiago were small and heavily dependent on their colleagues in Puerto Plata because they possessed less capital and did not have direct contacts with the German importers. "With only a few exceptions the commerce of Santiago cannot maintain itself without the help of Puerto Plata. The merchant of the interior cannot move without its assistance" 26 . These exceptions were the houses of Ginebra and Heinsen -the latter of German descentwhich were based in Santiago and were considered to be two of the largest mercantile houses in the country.
Some saw the danger of the heavy dependence on tobacco for the Cibao. This was above all the result of the great crisis which shook the world economy after 1873, but the Governor of Santiago had already in 1870 drawn attention to the fact that the population of the Cibao dedicated itself exclusively to "the cultivation of a crop, which is almost an article of luxury and subject to so many fluctuations, and which is only accepted in a few places or rather, in only one"
21 . Yet most Dominican merchants went on with their trade as if nothing had happened. The only sign that they were becoming increasingly nervous was their repeated attacks on the lazy and careless peasants who were supposed to bring Dominican tobacco in discredit. In mercantile circles it became common to blame the low tobacco prices primarily on the malevolence and stupidity of the peasants who cheated the merchants and did not treat the tobacco properly 28 .
It is impossible to ascertain the truth of these accusations. No fixed standards exist to determine the quality of tobacco. Every type of tobacco has its own use and market price. Opinions about the quality of Dominican tobacco as they appeared in the local press were strongly coloured by mercantile interests. Complaints about the bad preparation of the tobacco provided a good excuse for decreasing the prices paid to the producer. It was no coincidence that these complaints became so loud in a time of international crisis. Deteriorating market conditions led in this way directly to lower prices for the producer. They decreased from 20 pesos per quintal in 1849 to a mere 9 pesos in 1872 29 . It must be assumed that the quality of the Cibao tobacco had indeed declined in the course of this process. Many of the more affluent planters stopped production and became merchants. The peasant population continued to cultivate tobacco on a small and technologically primitive scale. They needed the tobacco for a small cash income, but for the rest they lived in a subsistence economy. When prices fell, they responded by growing more and caring less. The newspaper El Orden wrote in 1874: "[T]he peasants do not feel the obligation to go on cultivating with the same care and procedures, because they have the impression that the new prices will not compensate them for their efforts" 30 . Dominican tobacco came to occupy a different position in the world market and this was reflected directly in the productive sector. Alongside the qualitatively better tobacco from Brazil and the Dutch East Indies, it became an average dark type, which was useful as cigar filler, but could no longer be sold at its former high prices. In this process, the cultivation of Dominican tobacco became the exclusive domain of the peasant families.
DOMINICAN TOBACCO IN CRISIS, 1879-1914
In 1874 the first steam-powered sugar-cane plantation in the Dominican Republic was established. Within less than ten years cuban and Dominican entrepreneurs had founded thirty more plantations in the southern part of the country. The booming sugar sector attracted capital and labour from all parts of the country and the economic nexus of the country shifted definitively to the south. The Cibao lost its former economic predominance and tobacco was relegated to second place. It is significant that the dictator Ulises Heureaux (1884-1899), who began his career defending the Cibao tobacco interests, ended up as the hero of the southern sugar industry. When the Samaná-La Vega railroad began to operate in the eastern part of the Cibao-valley in the 1890s, wealthy entrepreneurs established cocoa farms. Cocoa rapidly became an important export product in this region, which emphasized the position of tobacco as a poor man's crop even more 31 .
Why did tobacco lose so much of its economic importance? The answer has mainly to be sought in changes on the German market. The position of the Hanseatic cities gradually changed in the second half of the 19th century. They could no longer ignore the attraction of the Zollverein, which had been established in 1834. Their struggle for economic independence finally gave in to the advantages of the German continental market. In the context of growing competition with England and a new wave of European protectionism, association with the Zollverein was inevitable. Bremen long resisted association under the direction of its tobac- co merchants, but it finally accepted the conditions of the Zollverein in 1881 as the last Hanseatic city 32 . As members of the Zollverein the position of Hamburg and Bremen changed fundamentally. They became "continental" cities, forced to submit to the protectionist measures which characterized Bismarck's desire to forge a strong German economy. The tobacco trade was one of the first to feel the effects of these changes. After a long public discussion and a fierce battle in the Reichstag against Bismarck's project of a tobacco monopoly, a law was passed which raised the import duties on tobacco from 40 to 85 Mark per 100 kg. 33 . The duty was irrespective of the price or quality of the tobacco and thus most affected the cheap, dark tobaccos such as those which came from the Dominican Republic.
The consequence of the German legislation was a price drop of some 30% for Dominican tobacco on the Hamburg market, compared to the already low average price of the 1870s. The price paid to the producer decreased from 9 to 4 pesos per quintal (Table I ). The ensuing crisis in the Cibao dramatically underscored the weakness of its commercial sector. The fate of the Dominican tobacco merchants was tightly bound up with the cyclical fluctuations of the German market and the results of this price drop were catastrophic. Many merchants went out of business, while others survived on a minimum level of activities. Santiago's most important periodical of this period, the Eco del Pueblo, wrote in 1882: "Three years ago the commercial sector in Santiago was embellished by twentyfive commercial establishments, which are closed today: a bitter contrast with yesterday" 34 .1\vo years later it wrote that only six of the original 25 enterprises were still in operation 35 . The effects of the depreciation of Dominican tobacco are not easily ascertained. Its most logical conse- 32 On the fierce resistance to the association with the Zollverein in the ranks of the Bremen tobacco merchants: L. Beutin, "Drei Jahrhunderte Tkbakhandel in Bremen": quence would have been the disappearance of Dominican tobacco from the world market, but that did not happen. Although production slowed down a little in the remaining years of the 19th century, between 70.000 and 130.000 quintales of tobacco continued to arrive on the German markets every year. Prices dropped to their lowest level of the century, but the peasant producers never stopped cultivating it. If the harvest turned out to be extremely small in some years, this was due to adverse weather conditions, not to a conscious reaction of the peasants.
What we see is much more a restructuration of the productive sector. Geographically, tobacco lost some of its attraction in the most favourable lands in the centre of the Cibao, around and south-east of Santiago. The production of tobacco was gradually pushed away to the more arid northwestern part of the Cibao valley (La Línea) and into the slopes of the Sierra. In the same process, social differentiation occurred in which tobacco was produced by the poorest groups of peasant society. Because of the short maturing time of tobacco, they could easily integrate its cultivation in their subsistence agriculture. They were also used to preparing the tobacco themselves, making primitive cigars or andullos, pressed tobacco rolls. Paradoxically, one could say that tobacco maintained its market position because its producers pulled out from the market into a system of subsistence agriculture.
At the same time, the state was too weak and ineffective to have a decisive influence on the course of events. If it had had the power, it would in all likelihood have compelled the peasantry to cultivate other cash crops, such as cotton, rice or coffee. However, plans of this kind failed without exception. Its only alternative was to try to improve the quality of Dominican tobacco. Provincial authorities started to distribute seeds of better types of tobacco. They also fostered fincas modelos where some basic agrarian training was given 36 . In the 1890s some Cuban tobacco growers were contracted to instruct the Dominican growers in the technicalities of tobacco growing. All these measures had little effect. Firstly, these innovative efforts did not go hand in hand with improvements in the regional infrastructure. Roads remained notoriously bad. Transport costs within the region became even higher than the costs of shipment of the tobacco to Germany (Table I) . Secondly, they ignored the fundamental logic of the situation. The German importers were not really interested in better prepared Dominican tobacco. They needed a cheap, strong-tasting tobacco which could be used as a filler in German cigars 37 . In this respect, the peasantization of Dominican tobacco production suited them very well. It guaranteed the supply of Dominican tobacco and enabled them to reduce prices to an absolute minimum.
As we have already seen, it was the mercantile class which was most severely affected by the economic crisis. Many German merchants had left the country. Hamburg and Bremen remained as the two important markets for Dominican tobacco, but the low prices and the limited number of importing houses did not justify the presence of German agents in the country. The tobacco export became the exclusive business of Dominican merchants. They used German credits to buy the tobacco from the producer and sent it to Germany to pay their debts and the imports they had ordered. The regional power and affluence which the Dominican merchants gained in the process were won at the expense of an increased dependence on the German market.
It is thus no coincidence that proto-nationalist sentiments emerged in this period. The German market was blamed for the problems of the Dominican tobacco sector. A dependent mercantile bourgeoisie had emerged which resented its dependence on the German creditors. It expressed its frustration in a nationalist rhetoric, blaming the crisis in the tobacco sector on the domination of the German merchants, "those leeches who suck our juices and take all the profits" 38 . Anti-German sentiments had always existed in the Cibao, but when the crisis progressed and profit margins fell, they grew sharper. From the 1880s onwards the local press was full of accusations that the Germans were manipulating 37 The strong opinion of José Ramón Abad about this aspect of the tobacco trade is worth noting: "Hamburg has found in our leaf a very profitable type of tobacco, as long as it retains the low prices to which it has been restricted. This influence of the Hamburg market has been decisive and fatal for our leaf, which has had no stimulus for improvement. The Dominican purchasers, as agents for the German houses, do all they can to obtain as much weight and quantity as possible. Therefore the cultivators opt for cultivation of tobacco on virgin, very dark and rich lands. In this way they obtain a large amount of tobacco of low quality". J.R. Abad, La República Dominicana. Reseña general geográjico-estadística (Santo Domingo 1888, photographic reprint, Banco Central de la República Dominicana 1972), p. 317.
38 El Diario, 2-6-1910, "El tabaco".
the markets and resorting to other malpractices. The nationalist rhetoric which always characterised these articles was sometimes supplemented by a touch of anti-semitism, because it was assumed that most importers in Hamburg and Bremen were Jewish 39 . The Dominican anger centred around two themes: the manipulation of the market by the German importers and their sabotage of Dominican attempts to find alternative markets. The charge that the German merchants manipulated the market in order to pay lower prices for the tobacco was an old and recurrent complaint. The transatlantic trip which took about a month and the deficient means of communication, which were moreover largely controlled by European enterprises, provided ample grounds for such suspicions. The construction of a telegraph line in 1884 was no remedy for this situation. On the contrary, the historian who reads the excited and often incorrect news from Europe in the Cibao newspapers gains the impression that the telegraph augmented the tension and suspense about the market situation in Germany.
The German merchants had two levers to put pressure on the Dominican tobacco market. Firstly, they tried to manipulate the news from Germany. When the first shipments of Dominican tobacco arrived, they cabled favourable judgements on its quality and price to the Dominican Republic. On the arrival of the news, the Dominican merchants tried to ship their tobacco harvest to Germany as rapidly as possible. When the bulk of the Dominican tobacco had been sent in this way, less favourable reports were suddenly received from Germany. The disappointing quality of the tobacco, the slackening demand in Europe, the large stocks left over from the preceding harvest, all conspired to explain the depressed prices for the tobacco. "There goes the second shipment. And then the telex tells us in its disheartening words that the tobacco prices have gone drastically down" 40 .
The situation of the German market was so crucial because the Dominican merchants had to fulfil their contractual obligations. They had to pay back their debts to the same German importers who had granted them credit. This credit trap was the other very effective means by which the German importers put pressure on their Dominican counter-parts. As we have already seen, most of the Dominican merchants borrowed money to buy the tobacco and ordered European goods at the same time. In general they resorted to the short-term credits which the importers offered and which they had to pay back in cash or tobacco. It is evident that they were hardly in a position to negotiate when the German importers were demanding repayment of their credits and at the same time offering low prices for their tobacco. Pedro M. Archambault vividly depicted this situation: Of course, the alarmed and indignant commentators tended to give a one-sided and exaggerated point of view. The fact that trade continued during all these years may in itself be an indication that profits were to be made by Dominican merchants too. Their anger was often very selective and tended to conceal their own little habits and tricks, such as underestimating the harvest, putting extra weight in the serones or including inferior leaves in high-graded lots. Nevertheless, the anti-German feelings of the Dominican mercantile class were based on a structurally inferior market position. They reflected the frustration such dependence entailed in the minds of a nascent commercial bourgeoisie.
In a situation of faltering demand and decreasing prices, it is logical that the Dominican exporters tried to explore the possibilities of new markets. The search for alternative markets became atopic for continuous and heated debate from the end of the 19th century. Private individuals and official representatives went to Europe to interest tobacco consumers, such as Spain, France and Holland, in importing their Dominican tobacco directly without the mediation of the German "trust", as it was scorn-fully called in the local press. The failure of these attempts formed the second great frustration of the Dominican merchants. The Dominican consul in Hamburg reported in 1891 that "[t]he experiment with the Dutch market did not have any results, and the imported loads have been re-exported to this city to be sold" 42 . Similar attempts on other markets failed equally and this was generally blamed on the German manipulations. The German importers, it was said, did all they could to undermine these Dominican initiatives. When necessary, they offered very low prices to potential buyers in order to undercut Dominican offers.
For instance, an attempt by the Dominican government to reach an agreement with Spain in 1901 failed because the Germans offered them better conditions: "It became evident that Spain received from the German consignees profitable advantages concerning the Dominican tobacco, which were greater than what we offered. . " 43 . In 1920, it was still reported that a Dominican attempt to sell tobacco directly to Spain "has foundered on the resistance of the Spanish Tabacalera, which does not dare to provoke the wrath of the cartels alemanes" 4 *. When the Dominican merchants tried to establish themselves on the Hanseatic markets and sell their own tobacco, the German merchants adopted similar actions. It was said that an effort by the Dominican firm Jimenes Grullón & Co. in 1891 failed only because the German importers -"por ser gente muy rica" -"could offer their supplies of that year with two and even three years credit" 45 .
We may be sure that the conscious manipulation of the market such as denounced in the Dominican press actually took place, but the German importers did not in general need to resort to such rude and unsophisticated methods. Their financial power secured their dominion over the market. Besides, they were not in the least interested in forcing their Dominican counterparts out of business. With the departure of most of the German merchants from the island, the continuity of the Dominican tobacco export depended on the survival of the Dominican merchants.
The weak position of the Dominican merchants was also a consequence of the structure of the international tobacco market. From the end of the 19th century the patterns of consumption started to change, and with it 42 Gaceta Oficial, XVIII, 902, 5-12-1891, "Comercio de Hamburgo". 43 El Normalismo, I, 21, 11-9-1901. 44 La Información, V, 1952, 6-9-1920. 45 El Diario, VI, 1517, 17-8-1907, "La cuestión palpitante". the structure of international trade. Partly as a result of the expansion of the Dutch East Indian tobacco culture, a distinct preference for lighter types of tobacco emerged. The market for dark tobacco did not disappear, but it lost importance and suffered declining prices. Especially in the regions where adequate innovations failed to take place, such as Colombia or the Dominican Republic, profits diminished dramatically and the local mercantile class lost much of its negotiation power. At the same time a concentration took place in the German import sector. The decentralized structure of the tobacco trade in the 19th century, when every ship-owner was effectively a merchant, made way for a highly structured organization controlled by a small number of import firms. These were the first line of buyers, the so-called "first hand". They were the only enterprises able to raise the huge amounts of money which were involved in this trade. The first-hand importers had to grant long term credits to the foreign exporters as well as to the German manufactures who processed the tobacco. The import of tobacco therefore showed clear oligopolistic tendencies, in which a small group of capitalist entrepreneurs could easily manipulate the market.
In the course of time, a second group of smaller German merchants arose between the importers and the tobacco processing sector. These "second hand" merchants often used a network of travelling agents who distributed the tobacco in the country 46 . Dominican tobacco played only a minor role in the large and complicated network of the tobacco trade. Since it was a cheap and dark variety with a "neutral" taste, it could always be used but was not indispensable. The Dominican exporters were therefore hardly in a position to negotiate better conditions and had to accept the prices fixed by the German buyers.
WINDS OF CHANGE: CIGARETTE MANUFACTURE IN THE CIBAO
Some Dominican tobacco had always been consumed within the country itself. Originally this had been in the form of locally produced cigars 46 The tobacco trade was a very complicated affair. Only a few books exist which really try to understand its intricacies. Very interesting, but almost unavailable is: Mehrmann, op.cit. General information can be found in: J. and andullos. In the last decades of the 19th century manufacture took a new turn and many small factories sprang up in the urban centres. Investments were sometimes made and different forms of wage labour were used, but as a rule they were small, capital-extensive sweat shops. They were principally directed at the home market, although there were occasional exports to Haiti. This picture changed drastically when the cigarette factory La Habanera started in 1902. It was founded by the German entrepreneur Richard Söllner and may well be considered the source of the revival of the Dominican tobacco sector. Perhaps drawn to Santiago by a local progresista* 1 , Söllner set up a modern mechanized factory claiming to produce 1,2 million cigarettes a day. If we accept this figure, it must be assumed that the factory had the most advanced machines of that period. Supplementing its activities with the production of cigars, it proved to be a very prosperous undertaking. In the process of its expansion, the factory became a large consumer of Dominican tobacco. It is not clear wether the enterprise included the cultivation of tobacco from the start, but it rapidly extended its activities to the realm of production. In the first instance, attention was directed to the supervision and guidance of the peasant producers. The company distributed seeds and gave technical advice on preferred types of tobacco and methods of cultivation. The company soon went a step further and started to buy land of its own. Then it hired peasants to cultivate the tobacco according to the wishes of the company. In 1910 it already possessed more than 15.000 vegas of tobacco 48 .
The successful intervention of La Habanera in the realm of production is an interesting phenomenon. It must be explained by the fact that for the first time labour intensive improvements in agricultural practice were effectively compensated by higher prices. As we have seen, inadequate compensation had been the principal obstacle to the improvement of Dominican tobacco. La Habanera broke with this practice and paid high prices for good quality tobacco. When in 1909 the average price was 1, 2 and 3 pesos for the three grades of Dominican tobacco, La Habanera payed 20 pesos for a well prepared tobacco 49 . The policy of La Habanera did not fail to bring grist to the mill of Richard Söllner. A German diplomat observed in 1912 that La Habanera had made Söllner "a very rich man". He lived in Hamburg and only occasionally visited his enterprise in Santiago 50 . In 1914 Söllner turned his factory into a limited liability company, the Compañía Anónima Tkbacalera. Although he remained president, some Dominican participation was now accepted 51 . It is very probable that Söllner made this move in view of the political and economic competition between Germany and the US and the impending World War. By accepting Dominican participation he safeguarded his enterprise against anti-German measures or even confiscation. This may be considered a clear example of the pragmatism which Herwig sees as characteristic of the German businessmen in Latin America.
Söllner's factory was only one very successful example of a general tendency. In the first decades of the 20th century many cigar and cigarette factories emerged. Some of them, like La Matilde or La Aurora were nearly as successful as La Habanera, though on a smaller scale. Gradually a market for tobacco came into existence within the country. This somewhat decreased dependence on the European market and strengthened the importance of tobacco for the national economy.
RESTRUCTURING THE DOMINICAN TOBACCO TKADE, Periodizations in economic history often suggest a clarity and unambiguity which can be misleading. In respect of Latin American trade relations in which Germany was involved, however, the year 1914 is an indisputable turning-point. The outbreak of the First World War put a definite end to whatever illusions German politicians may have preserved about Germany's imperial destiny in the Caribbean. At the same time it cut Germany off from the Latin American markets.
Moreover backyard once and for all. Competition between the two world powers, which had been simmering since the first years of the 20th century, now came to a head. The US induced local governments to restrict their trade with Germany and wherever possible it promoted the confiscation of German property. In Haiti and the Dominican Republic the application of this policy was facilitated by the US occupation of the two countries in 1915 and 1916 respectively. These occupations may indeed be partly considered as the result of the German-US feud. With respect to the Haitian case, Schmidt states: "A primary purpose of the American intervention in 1915 had been to counteract the presumed threat of German encroachment" 52 . German influence was probably a less important issue in the occupation of the Dominican Republic 53 , but the result was largely the same. Commercial relations with Germany were cut off and German interests in the country brought back to a minimum.
There was initially some optimism in the tobacco sector of the Cibao. The revolutionary disturbances in thè country were temporarily checked and the end of the German trade connection was regretted by only a few. This optimism seemd to be justified when in 1917 Spain and France sent representatives to the Cibao to buy tobacco, "sin intercesión de trust alguno", as it was jubilantly announced 54 . But once more the tobacco market proved less flexible than many inhabitants of the Cibao hoped or expected. The Spanish Tabacalera refrained from buying on the Dominican market altogether 55 and the French remained small-scale and hesitant buyers. Some US enterprises such as the Tropical Tobacco Co. and the Southern Leaf Tobacco Company, started doing business on the island, but these companies were above all interested in quick profits. When prices were high during the post-war euphoria, the Danza de los milliones, Southern Leaf bought large quantities of tobacco for the French Régie 56 . When prices fell and crisis hit the Cibao, it simply suspended its operations. The US military government tried to stay out of the tobacco sector as long as it possibly could, but with the abrupt end of the Danza de los milliones it had to do something. Many members of the Cibao elite had supported the American intervention because they had hoped that it would bring them the long awaited preferential access of Dominican tobacco to the US market. In their opinion, this would solve the commercial problems and guarantee the future of Dominican tobacco in one stroke 57 . However, there was no way by which the military government could grant such a privilege. Having to modernize a semi-colony was one thing, promoting measures which might stimulate competition with production in the mother country was quite another. As an official dryly remarked: "The antipathy which would incite such a measure in the minds of the American producers dooms any policy which tends to favour a competitor" 58 .
To show its goodwill and to restore tranquillity in the region, the already debt-ridden US government promised in 1920 to buy the entire tobacco production of the Cibao for a minimum price of 4 pesos per quintal. The buying itself was not all that simple, but the real problem was to sell the tobacco which was now piled up in the storehouses. Demand was low and access to the international purchasers had always been via the mediation of the German importers. Even the concerted efforts of the Dominican diplomatic representatives in Italy, England and Spain, who were allowed to offer a credit of 120 days, could not accelerate commercial activity 59 .
The tobacco was only sold slowly and never for profitable prices. After three seasons of buying tobacco the US government still had 100.000 quintales unsold in the storehouses at the end of 1922 60 . The next year the US government therefore revoked its policy. Dominican tobacco was back where it had always been: on a speculative market with only a limited number of potential buyers. 57 See for instance the letter of the Ayuntamientos del Cibao to the Military Government, 20-10-1919, AGN, Legajos Gobierno Militar, Hacienda y Comercio, 121. This letter asked for "some duty exemptions in the United States which will permit the introduction of Dominican tobacco on that market with favourable advantages for producers and merchants in the Republic". However, many things were changing on the international tobacco market. The existence of new areas of mass tobacco consumption in North Africa and a rapid growth in cigarette consumption in the industrialised world increased the demand for strong dark tobaccos and created a new European interest in the traditional regions of production, such as Colombia, Brazil and the Dominican Republic. Hamburg and Bremen maintained their important, although no longer undisputed position on the international market of dark tobaccos. Even in Latin America, where German business had suffered from blacklisting and confiscation, Hanseatic businessmen soon reappeared 61 . The German commercial sector naturally felt the consequences of the instability of the Weimar Republic and its uncontrolled inflation, but as international merchants whose mediation was still necessary, they saw their trade turnover rapidly increase. In the case of tobacco, the Hanseatic merchants benefitted considerably from the prolonged decentralization of the North European cigar industry, which consisted of thousands of small enterprises. The prominence of the tobacco importers was due above all to their essential role in the distribution of tobacco. They did not lose this position until after the Second World War when the cigar production was almost completely mechanized and concentrated in the hands of a few large companies. On the other hand, competition increased considerably in this period. The influential monopolies of France and Spain started to organize public subscriptions at which importers had to make competitive offers for large quantities of tobacco. These offers often had to be made before the harvest in the different production areas had begun 62 . This added a new element to the trade. Contracts had to be fulfilled and this led to increased competition in the purchase of the cheaper kind of tobaccos.
The consequences for the Dominican tobacco sector were twofold. Firstly, its market became more competitive. After the departure of the US marines in 1924, merchants from different European countries returned to the country and the unchallenged German monopoly disappeared. From the 1920s onwards the Dominican tobacco harvest was more or less evenly divided between Belgian, Dutch, French and German pur- 63 . It is true that it was the German cigar industry which continued to use most of the Dominican tobacco, but a large share of it was now provided by the Dutch and Belgian importers. Dominicans sometimes took this to be a sign that the increased competition for Dominican tobacco was only imaginary 64 , but for the German merchants this was certainly not the case. They did all they could to recover their dominant position in the Dominican tobacco trade.
Secondly, and connected with the former point, the international trade in Dominican tobacco gradually came to take place in the Cibao itself. While in former times the fate of Dominican tobacco had been decided in Hamburg and Bremen, the increased competition now forced the European importers to send their own representatives to the Cibao. In imitation of American firms, the Europeans gradually entered the region. Some only sent employees in the harvest season. Others established offices which were occupied all year round. These enterprises also started to build storehouses and to do part of the processing of the tobacco in the region itself. By 1925 the very successful French merchant Albert Oquet, who started a cigar factory in 1919, possessed storehouses in different parts of the region and employed several thousand people in the harvest season 65 . The General Sales Company had 17 storehouses in 1934 66 . Because of the US occupation the German merchants did not return to the region until some years later. Only one German firm, Schultze & Lembcke, kept an office in the country during this period. The rest of the German tobacco merchants had to make a new start in the 1920s. It is interesting to note that they retained the pre-war system of commerce. Unlike their competitors, the German importers did not establish offices and storehouses in the Cibao, but continued to trade through the mediation of Dominican merchants. They were probably able to do so because of their long-established contacts in the region. It was only when their share of the market increased again in the second half of the 1920s that German firms started to send their own agents to the Cibao during the tobacco harvest 67 . The increased competition between the purchasers and their presence in the Cibao contributed to a certain stabilization of the Dominican tobacco market. In the words of the principal newspaper of Santiago, La Información: "The presence of the buyers, representatives and directors of the tobacco buying houses of Europe and the US makes the trade less difficult and risky (azaroso)"
68 . The existence of a national tobacco industry also contributed to more stability on the market. Although we do not have exact figures, factories such as the Compañía Anónima Tabacalera and the Aurora used up considerable amounts of tobacco. Since they produced mainly for the growing internal market, their demand was less vulnerable to sudden changes on the world market. Nonetheless, internal demand accounted for only a very small part of the entire tobacco production of the region and the dependence of the commercial class in the Cibao region on the world market continued. Tobacco remained the product which determined the fate of the Cibao merchants. An export delay or an unexpected small harvest affected every layer in Cibao society, but most of all the commercial sector. Its dependence on the result of the tobacco harvest very much resembled the situation of the 19th century merchants. For instance, it was reported in 1928 that:
"Due to the near stagnation of the tobacco buying by the exporters, and because this crop is the only one which keeps our commerce going at this moment, the absence of business is very clearly felt... As a consequence of this situation several small commercial enterprises have gone bankrupt and others have been forced to ask for suspension of payment" 69 .
It is interesting to see that the opposition between "internal" and "external" acquired a new meaning in this process. In describing the preceding period it was possible to assume a clear-cut opposition between Dominican and German interests. In the 1920s the relations between Dominican and European business were more complicated. In this period the commercial elite of the Cibao gradually came to consist of expatriate and native merchants whose interests were often closely intertwined 70 . Some Dominican entrepreneurs rose to high standing by connecting their business to foreign capital 71 . Others prospered by using their local influence and connections. Some foreign companies maintained their role as outsiders, just buying the tobacco and then leaving. Others, such as the Frenchman Oquet, completely integrated and became highly respected and permanent members of Santiago society. Nationalist feelings were now primarily directed against "Big Brother" in the north and the nationalist agitation against European influence virtually disappeared 72 .
This is not to say that criticism of merchant behaviour disappeared. On the contrary, the US occupation had provoked a mild political radicalism and the growth of a substantial (semi-)proletarian class in the cigar factories produced the first seeds of unionizing. In the wake of this development, the regional press became a lively commentator on the proceedings in the tobacco market in the Cibao. It expressed strong opinions on any market manipulation. Secret agreements for maximum prices between the tobacco companies were denounced every harvest season. Repeatedly measures were demanded against "the tobacco speculators who by general agreement make the prices go down, even lower than the foreign market"
73 . However, these accusations were directed not only against the foreign merchants, but against the merchant community in general. Sometimes the Europeans were even taken as an example of honesty by comparison with the malpractices of the Dominican merchants 74 .
However, the German traders did not lose their commercial wits. They never missed a chance to influence the market and to recover their former position. Occasionally false information about the market situation was divulged. This was a common practice in the mercantile community, but 70 This aspect of international trade is rightly emphasized in: D.C.M. Piatt "Introduction": Piatt, Business Imperialism, pp. 1-14. 71 For instance the company of the Hermanos Bonelly bought tobacco for a German importing house and possessed four store houses·. La Información, X, 2163,23-4-1925. 72 The most important newspaper of Santiago, La Información, was a good example of this trend. It had been closed a couple of times under the military government of the US marines and since then maintained a fierce anti-imperialist stance.
73 La Información, X, 2132, 16-3-1925, "El tabaco y su monopolio". 74 For instance, La Información, IX, 1963 IX, , 6-6-1924 it became less effective with the improved means of communication and the presence of competitors who were always eager to denounce other people's misbehaviour 75 . Their manipulation of the prices of Dominican tobacco in Germany was more effective. The German merchants sometimes tried to keep prices down artificially by dumping tobacco at the right moment. An anonymous observer described this practice in 1934 as follows:
"Since 1928 the system of centralization of Dominican tobacco is done in the following manner: The tobacco is bought for a low price. When competitors appear on the market who want to pay higher prices, the European purchasers offer the tobacco for a much lower price than what it costs in Santo Domingo, neutralizing the competitor in this way. Because of the absence of demand the prices then fall considerably. Taking advantage of this situation, the purchasers buy large stocks" 76 .
Although they are more difficult to perceive, the changes in the realm of production were certainly not insignificant. For one thing, the production which had started to rise with the establishment of various modern cigar and cigarette factories maintained its steady upward curve into the 1920s. In 1925 export reached a figure of 22 million kilos. When we include internal consumption we must assume that production came close to 30 million kilos.
In fact two types of tobacco were now generally cultivated. The so-called criollo tobacco was intended for export. The majority of the somewhat better olor tobacco was consumed internally. Olor tobacco always yielded higher prices and was therefore preferred by the more market-oriented producers. Criollo tobacco remained the tobacco for the small-scale peasant producers because it was stronger and less sensitive to adverse weather conditions. With the growing competition between the merchants, improvements in the quality of the tobacco started to pay off for the producers.
Alongside the peasant sector a more capitalist group of tobacco producers emerged, which bought land, invested capital and applied technical improvements. They were members of the expanding Cibao bourgeoisie which strongly increased in number and social significance in the first decades of the 20th century. Their private enterprises developed in close harmony with the modernizing, nationalist government of Horacio Vásquez (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) . Using the new land laws and taking advantage of the construction of irrigation systems in the region, this vigorous class of rural entrepreneurs became a dominant element in the rural areas 77 . Supported by the agronomic research on the experimental farms established by the government, they experimented with new methods of cultivation, different varieties and better controlled fermentation. The plough which had made inroads in the region around the turn of the century became generally used. Some even started to use fertilizers imported from Germany.
Pressure on the fertile lands of the Cibao increased simultaneously. When the "Law of Land Registration" put an end to the ambiguous pattern of landholding in the Republic in 1920, many well-to-do Cibaeños invested in land which they tried to make profitable by growing tobacco. Some of them took charge of the agriculture themselves, but many took advantage of the increased enclosure of the peasantry and started to produce tobacco by share-cropping arrangements. As a result of the limited access to land caused by its monopolization by this group of urban and rural entrepreneurs and to a lesser extent by demographic growth, the independence of the peasantry was gradually diminishing. Many peasants were forced to enter share-cropping contracts, a medias, with the new landowners. They worked the land and cultivated the tobacco. After the harvest the landowners sold the tobacco and gave half of the earnings to the peasant families 78 .
The incorporation of the peasantry was only partial, though, and it did not lead to complete dependence on tobacco earnings. During the world crisis of the 1930s, when the tobacco prices fell to an absolute minimum, leaving the producer in the Cibao 60 centavos per quintal, many peasants simply withdrew from the market. Dominican tobacco production fell to a quarter of the pre-crisis amount and the tobacco market in the Cibao came to a virtual standstill. But while the Cibao elite loudly lamented its losses, the peasantry continued its subsistence agriculture, apparently un- disturbed by the events, so undisturbed that the crisis left hardly any traces on the collective memory 79 . Some words must be said on the end of German involvement in the Cibao. By the end of the 1920s the Hanseatic cities had more or less recuperated their dominant position on the European tobacco market, but their revival proved shortlived. The world crisis of the 1930s and the rise of the National Socialist Party to power in 1933 definitively sealed the Hanseatic era. As an answer to the crisis -protecting the German tobacco producers and increasing the state revenues -the German import duties on tobacco were increased in 1931. The decreased consumption and the high duties severely affected the tobacco import 80 .
In 1933 the National Socialist government introduced a "balanced trade" policy, which aimed at a bilateral exchange of goods between Germany and its trading partners without the intervention of private enterprise 81 . The Dominican minister of Agriculture had already received a confidential letter from the German Weltwirtschaftsdienst in 1931 in which such an exchange of goods (intercambio directo) was warmly recommended. Anticipating the coming to power of the National Socialist Party "to which the majority of the population already entrusts the salvation of the country" this trade could be a way "to get rid of the pernicious dominance of the international financiers and banks" 82 .
This letter was probably received with a polite silence, but when this policy was effectively forced upon the Dominican tobacco exporters in 1934, reaction was far from pleased. A German merchant reported an "unpleasant atmosphere" in the Cibao as a result of the measures 83 . Just as in other Latin American countries, the trade policy was seen as an obstacle to free trade and one more trick to depress the prices of agricultural commodities.
The undiplomatic Nazi propaganda helped to undermine German interests even more. Although the Dominican president Trujillo undoubtedly had strong sympathies for German National Socialism and above all for its leader, the proximity of the United States prevented him from putting these into political practice. In 1933 an Auslandsorganisation of the Nazi party was founded in Ciudad Trujillo (Santo Domingo) 84 , but it never got a firm footing on the island. On the contrary, the organization soon caused dissent and political feuds within the German community. A German consul complained desperately in 1935 about the Stänkereien and Streitigkeiten among the ranks of the Germans living in Santo Domingo as a result of the Nazi propaganda 85 .
As a result of the events of the 1930s, German influence in the Dominican Republic gradually withered away. The Dutch took over the tobacco trade and emerged after the Second World War as the principal buyers of Dominican tobacco. In 1939 it was reported that " [t] he German tobacco colony on the island (the Dominican Republic; MB) has impoverished in the real sense of the word. At the same time the German influence on the transit-trade has disappeared completely" 86 .
CONCLUSION
In this article we have tried to give an example of an international trading system and its consequences for a regional economy in the Caribbean. We have seen that the effects of international commodity trade can take various, sometimes widely diverging forms under different historical circumstances. Of course, many topics have only been lightly and superficially touched upon. The organization and the development of the peasant economy deserves much more study. The same is true of German commerce. Until business archives are found, it will be very difficult to understand all the intricacies of international trade, let alone the German percep- tion of its trade relations with a faraway country such as the Dominican Republic. It is only a regional approach to international trade, however, which may enable us to understand and explain the variety of responses and the different consequences it has provoked.
Such an approach to the analysis of international trade will put an end to the simple internal-external dichotomy of the dependencia theories, but it also strongly qualifies the naive neo-classical model of which D.C.M. Piatt has been the fiercest defender. Local societies changed, partly as a result of international trade relations, partly through their internal dynamics. Sometimes they demonstrated a strong economic resilience, sometimes they lost ground. Only detailed historical research can hope to explain the results of international trade for different groups of historical actors. In the particular case of the Dominican-German tobacco trade, we have gained a few insights.
Firstly, it appears that the effects of a changing world market on commodity producing regions are less unidirectional than is commonly supposed. The ultimate outcome of changing world market prices or shifting patterns of consumption is decided within the producing region itself. The entrance on the world market of Dutch East Indian and Brazilian tobaccos and the protective customs policy in Germany decreased the demand for Dominican tobacco and created a fall in prices, but it was the specific structure of the late 19th century Cibao which determined its consequences. In Cuba and Brazil it led to technical improvement of the tobacco cultivation and increased state intervention, in Colombia it led to a virtual disappearance of tobacco as an export product, but in the Cibao it created a tobacco producing peasant economy. The low prices drove the more market-oriented cultivators away. The urban merchants did not have the means to enter the production process themselves. In this way they had to leave production to a peasant class which maintained considerable autonomy owing to open land resources. It may well be that the crisis in the Dominican mercantile sector in the late 19th century was the main factor in guaranteeing the survival of an autonomous peasantry in the region.
A second theme of interest concerns the rise of a regional bourgeoisie. It seems fruitful to analyse the development of such a new elite faction in its internal as well as in its international context, without sacrificing one for the other. The changes in the position of the mercantile class in the Cibao were very significant. Mercantile activity in the region originated in a primitive import-export trade in which tobacco and some other commodities were bartered for European consumption goods. The settlement of German merchants greatly stimulated commercial activity in the region. They provided the Cibao merchants with credits and enabled them to expand their business. When a commercial crisis brought prices down and credit facilities tightened in the 1870s, the merchants of the Cibao were confronted with the negative consequences of their economic dependence. Many went bankrupt and all suffered considerable losses. The restrictive measures of the Bismarck regime and the general crisis caused a concentration in the Hanseatic tobacco business. The German merchants withdrew from the Cibao because they were unable to extract profits from the languishing trade, but Hamburg and Bremen remained the principal markets for dark Latin American tobacco.
In the long run, the disappearance of the Germans enabled the Dominican merchants to take hold of the export trade and establish themselves as the dominant class of the Cibao. As exporters of Dominican commodities they were virtually the only group which had access to foreign credits. They gradually moved into the industrial sector which had started with the processing of tobacco. This provided them with a strong economic and political position in the region. The tension which existed between this unchallenged local power and the continuing dependence on German credit eventually fomented strong anti-German feelings and a proto-nationalist ideology.
After the US occupation of the island foreign businessmen from different nations gradually started to establish themselves in the region again and the internal-external distinction dissolved. National and expatriate capital started to intertwine, often linked in joint-ventures. The new, vigorous bourgeoisie which was thus coming into existence directed its attention towards the agricultural sector. In the 1920s and 1930s many urban merchants started to buy land and to engage in agricultural activities. This was greatly stimulated by state-sponsored irrigation works and infrastructural improvements.
Land became a scarce commodity in the process. Peasant agriculture came under siege and more and more peasant producers had to accept share-cropping arrangements. The incorporation of the peasant sector was only partial, though, because even under the changed circumstances subsistence agriculture remained a point of refuge. This enabled the peasants to survive the crisis of the 1930s, when many merchants were ruined, relatively unscathed.
